Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 7

2009

Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Protection: The Rocky Results of Air Quality Violations
Erica Sharkey

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj
Part of the Environmental Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Erica Sharkey, Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection: The Rocky Results of
Air Quality Violations, 20 Vill. Envtl. L.J. 337 (2009).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol20/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Environmental Law Journal by an authorized editor of
Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

2009]
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EUREKA STONE QUARRY, INC. V. DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE ROCKY
RESULTS OF AIR QUALITY VIOLATIONS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Most people know the adage, "sticks and stones may break my
bones, but words will never hurt me." For a corporation that specializes in excavating stones, the words "penalty" and "compliance
docket" can potentially hurt the company tremendously.1
In 1960, the Pennsylvania legislature passed the Air Pollution
Control Act (Act) to reduce air pollution in accordance with the
federal Clean Air Act (CAA).2 The Act grants Pennsylvania's Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) the authority to set
emission standards for air pollutants, to issue building and equipment permits and to monitor the air quality index in the state.3
Additionally, the Act grants the DEP the power to enforce these
regulations by issuing fines to companies that violate air quality
emission standards, do not maintain proper equipment or do not
4
keep required records of equipment upgrades and maintenance.
The DEP may also place companies on a compliance docket,
which prohibits those companies from acquiring permits until they
comply with the law. 5 Placement on the compliance docket can
slow company business or even bring it to a complete halt.6
Companies that receive penalties or find themselves placed on
the compliance docket, however, are not without remedy. 7 These
companies may appeal to the Environmental Hearing Board
1. See Sarah Larson, Quarry Must Pay Big Fines: The EnvironmentalHearingBoard
Upheld Department of Environmental ProtectionAgainst Eureka Stone Quarryfor Air Quality Violations, INTELLIGENCER (Doylestown, PA), Aug. 24, 2007, at Bi (finding that
penalties and compliance docket issuances are serious enforcement actions).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006) (establishing need for national air quality standards); see also 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4002 (2003) (explaining Pennsylvania's policy
implementing Federal Clean Air Act provisions).
3. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4004 (2003) (enumerating DEP's powers and
duties).
4. See id. §§ 4007.1, 4009, 4010.1 (allowing DEP to review air quality compliance, issue penalties and enforce compliance).
5. See id. § 4010.1 (authorizing DEP to suspend or terminate businesses' plan
approvals and permits until Act violations are corrected).
6. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (recognizing compliance docket penalty
stops companies from applying for more permits or reviews).

7. See id. (noting Eureka's appeal to EHB).
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(EHB). 8 The EHB conducts trials to determine whether DEP actions are appropriate, and, if not, the EHB may overrule the DEP
sanctions against the companies. 9
Recently, the EHB had its first opportunity to review the DEP's
decision that placed a company on the compliance docket for Act
violations.' 0 In Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Department ofEnvironmental Protection (Eureka Stone Quarry),I a stone crushing company ap2
pealed the DEP enforcement actions for its air quality violations.'
While the EHB lowered many of the civil penalties issued against
Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. (Eureka), the board ultimately upheld
the DEP decision that placed Eureka on the compliance docket.' 3
This Note analyzes the EHB's decision in Eureka Stone Quarry.
Part II of the Note discusses the conflict between Eureka and the
DEP. 14 Part III of this Note examines the Act, which gives the DEP
authority to issue violations to companies that do not confine their
operations to the law.' 5 Part III also explores the EHB's purpose
and its role in Pennsylvania.16 Part IV considers the EHB decision
in Eureka Stone Quarry and analyzes the rationale behind the decision. 1 7 Part V provides a critical analysis of the EHB's holding in
this case as compared to its previous decisions.' 8 Finally, Part VI of
8. See The Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, History of the Environmental Hearing Board, http://ehb.courtapps.com/content/ehbhistory.php
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter History of the EHB] (providing persons or
corporations with forum to appeal DEP actions and seek relief).
9. See id. (explaining EHB has authority to alter DEP decisions if finding DEP
abused discretion, but noting EHB usually remands case to DEP for corrective
action).
10. See generally Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2006-044MG, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *61 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (noting
Eureka's placement on compliance docket constitutes issue of first impression for
EHB).
11. No. 2006-044-MG, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *2 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd.
Aug. 6, 2007).
12. See id. (challenging two significant civil penalties and placement on compliance docket in 2006).
13. See id. at **1-2 (lowering civil penalties from $175,300 to $93,350, but
holding DEP did not abuse discretion in using compliance docket action).
14. For a further discussion of the facts of Eureka Stone Quarry, see infra notes
19-41 and accompanying text.
15. For a further discussion of background information regarding DEP's authority to review company procedures and enforce compliance, see infra notes 4275 and accompanying text.
16. For a further background description of the appointment and functions
of the EHB, see infra notes 42-75 and accompanying text.
17. For a narrative analysis of the EHB's conclusions of law in Eureka Stone
Quarry, see infra notes 76-117 and accompanying text.
18. For a critical analysis of the EHB's reasoning in Eureka Stone Quarry, see
infra notes 118-162 and accompanying text.
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this Note discusses how the Eureka decision will affect future DEP
decisions.19

II.

FACTS

Eureka owns and operates three stone quarry facilities in Bucks
County, Pennsylvania. 20 At these facilities, stone crushing plants
and asphalt plants manufacture a variety of crushed stone and
asphalt. 21 Of the three facilities, only the Rush Valley and the
Chalfont facilities are subject to DEP-issued Air Quality State Only
22
Operating Permits; the Warrington facility is not.

Between September 2004 and November 2005, Inspector Robert Guzek and Compliance Specialist Christian Vlot of the DEP visited Eureka's facilities. 23 During their visits, they discovered faulty
machinery that caused multiple fugitive emissions violations. 24 The
inspectors also discovered that the company was not maintaining
DEP-required records. 2 5 Additionally, the inspectors found that the
company had a broken manometer, an important component of an
26
air pollution control device.
In January of 2006, after the company failed to respond to
three violation notices, the DEP placed Eureka on the compliance
docket.2 7 As a result, the DEP refused to issue any construction

19. For a discussion of the impact of Eureka Stone Quarryon DEP's future compliance docket use, see infra notes 163-99 and accompanying text.
20. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2006-044-MG, 2007
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **5-7 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (listing exact locations of Eureka's three asphalt plants and stone crushing facilities in Wrightstown
Township and Warrington Township, Bucks County).
21. See id. (detailing precise operations conducted at Rush Valley, Chalfont
and Warrington facilities).
22. See id. at *23 (explaining permit requires facilities to monitor NOx and
VOC emissions on rolling basis and keep maintenance and inspection records).
23. See id. at **7-18 (describing repeated DEP visits to Eureka's facilities).
24. See id. (observing fugitive dust emitted from excavation and stone crushing sites due to defective misting sprayers).
25. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **23-25 (determining that Eureka failed to monitor NOx and VOC emissions on rolling basis at
Chalfont and Rush Valley facilities).
26. See id. at *27 (finding Rush Valley's manometer cracked, disconnected
and inoperable). The manometer monitors the baghouse which is an air pollution
control device filtering particulate matter. Id. The manometer "provide[s] data
concerning the operation of the bags in the baghouse and indicate[s] when they
need to be cleaned or replaced." Id.
27. See id. at **29-30 (considering DEP's past enforcement actions and Eureka's failure to respond to violations in utilizing compliance docket).
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plan approvals or permits to Eureka until the violations were corrected and the company was in compliance with the law. 28

In May of 2006, the DEP and Eureka entered into a Consent
Order and Agreement. 29 During the meetings, Eureka agreed to
purchase wet-dust suppression air cleaning systems to correct its fugitive dust problems. 30 As a result of the negotiations and the company's intent to remedy violations, Eureka was removed from the
compliance docket. 3 1 Shortly thereafter, the DEP discovered that
Eureka had begun installing new wet-dust systems without first obtaining the required DEP plan approval. 32 When Eureka learned of
its error, however, it stopped using the systems and contacted the
33
DEP to correct the issue.
In June of 2006, Eureka received an Assessment of Civil Penalties for its problems and violations occurring in January 2006 and
June 2006. 34 While Eureka did not challenge its liability for fugitive

dust emissions violations, Eureka appealed to the EHB, complaining that the fines were excessive.3 5 Eureka also argued that it
was an unreasonable abuse of discretion for the DEP to place it on
36
the compliance docket.
In response, the DEP asserted that both the penalties and Eureka's placement on the compliance docket were reasonable.3 7
The DEP justified its actions based on its two years of inspections
and attempts to get Eureka to comply with the law. 38 Additionally,
28. See id. (notifying Eureka by letter that DEP halted plan approval for new
asphalt plant based on placement on compliance docket).
29. See id. at **35-36 (agreeing to comply with DEP regulations).
30. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **36-37 (agreeing
to install wet suppression system and implement environmental management
program).
31. See id. at *36 (noting Eureka's entering into Consent Order and Agreement led DEP to remove Eureka from compliance docket).
32. See id. at *37 (observing Eureka installed and operated NESCO wet system
without DEP plan approval and operating permit).
33. See id. at **38-39 (indicating Eureka stopped using system and contacted
DEP to correct issue once Eureka learned of violation).
34. See id. at *1. (assessing civil penalties for Eureka's violations totaled
$175,300).
35. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **40-46 (arguing
double penalty is unreasonable just because two facilities have permits).
36. See id. at *61 (claiming placement on compliance docket was abuse of
discretion as two facilities were in compliance and third was resolving violations).
37. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (asserting Eureka lacked intent to comply
with regulations leading to serious DEP enforcement actions).
38. See id. (noting Eureka's string of environmental issues over past several
years). For example, "even after [Eureka] was removed from the DEP's compliance docket in May 2006, the DEP discovered more violations." Id.
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the DEP stated that the compliance docket issue was moot because

it already removed Eureka from the docket.3 9
The EHB lowered many of the civil penalties, finding that fines
should not be doubled for companies holding state permits. 40 The
EHB decided, however, that the DEP's placement of Eureka on the
compliance docket was not an abuse of discretion and upheld the
action. 41 Dissatisfied with the result, Eureka appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the EHB's
42
decision.
III.

BACKGROUND

In 1970, the United States federal government responded to
increased public concern about air pollution by creating the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 43 Concurrently, Congress
passed the federal Clean Air Act (CAA).44 As amended in 1990, the

CAA mandates that all states comply with specific regulations to de45
crease air pollution in the country and reduce global warming.
A. Pennsylvania Environmental Regulation under the
Air Pollution Control Act
Pennsylvania enacted the Air Pollution Control Act (Act),
which imposes higher air quality standards than those mandated at
39. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **57-58 (contending
issue is moot because DEP removed Eureka from docket and granted NESCO
permits).
40. See Hearing Board Rules Against Eureka Stone Quarry's Appeal of DEP Action,
DEP DAILY UPDATE, Aug. 23, 2007, http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/news/cwp/

view.asp?Q=528027&A=3 (reducing January 2006 penalty from $126,550 to
$69,600 and reducing June 2006 penalty from $48,750 to $23,750).
41. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *63 (holding there
was sufficient evidence showing Eureka lacked intent to comply with DEP and was
properly placed on compliance docket).
42. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 957 A.2d 337, 344
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008) (explaining Commonwealth Court's reasoning for upholding EHB's decision).
43. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, About EPA: Our History,
http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (stating
Congress created EPA in responding to increased public demand for cleaner
water, air and land).
44. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, History of the Clean Air Act,
http://vww.epa.gov/air/caa/caahistory.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (creating legislation for comprehensive federal and state regulations to limit air pollution emissions).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006) (aiming to protect and enhance national air
quality through development of air pollution prevention programs in each state).
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the federal level. 4 6 The Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to enforce the rules and regulations of
the Act and to issue penalties for violating the law. 4 7 To facilitate

compliance, the DEP has the authority to enter any premises to in48
vestigate possible violations and ensure compliance.
Additionally, the Act enables the DEP to use the compliance
docket as another penalty tool. 49 The DEP can place a company on

the compliance docket, thereby barring that company from receiving a permit when the DEP finds that the company lacks the intention or ability to comply with the Act and its regulations. 50 Under
the Act, a permit applicant or a permitee may appeal its placement
on the compliance docket. 5 1 While the Act enables the DEP to issue civil penalties for permit violations, the Environmental Hearing
Board (EHB) has the power to adjust these penalties as it sees fit.5 2
The EHB's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing only the DEP's
final actions. 53 EHB trials are similar to civil trials in the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas; an exception is that the trials are
not heard in the presence of ajury.5 4 While the EHB is functionally
equivalent to a court of adjudication, it is not actually part of the
55
judicial branch of government.

46. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4002 (2003) (declaring policy to protect public

health, safety and well-being of citizens through CAA implementation).
47. For a description of DEP's powers, responsibilities and authority to enforce Act, see supra notes 3-7 and accompanying text.
48. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4007.1 (2003) (granting DEP power to conduct
compliance reviews); see also Keinath v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2001-253-MG,
2003 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 9, at *1 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Jan. 31, 2003) (affirming
$19,000 penalty issued to home constructor for obstructing DEP from inspecting
construction site).
49. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4007.1 (2003) (authorizing DEP to use compliance docket to bar permit issuance to companies failing to comply with Act).
50. See id. (noting DEP's ability to suspend, terminate or revoke a permit).
51. See id. § 4006 (granting EHB power to hear appeals from companies dissatisfied with placement on compliance docket).
52. See History of the EHB, supra note 8 (explaining that if EHB finds DEP
abused discretion, based on evidence provided, EHB may substitute own
discretion).
53. See id. (restricting EHB's jurisdiction).
54. See id. (explaining EHB's modus oporundi). The EHB, like courts, allows
litigants to use discovery, file pleadings, petitions, motions, briefs and participate
in hearings. Id.
55. See id. (giving DEP own legislative arm, Environmental Quality Board and
own judicial arm, EHB, comprised of administrative law judges). See also The
Pennsylvania Environmental Hearing Board, Welcome, http://ehb.courtapps.com
(last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (explaining current Pennsylvania Governor appoints
five judges to EHB and State Senate confirms appointment).
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The EHB reviews cases de novo.56 The EHB stated in Keinath v.
Department of Environmental Protection5 7 that appeals are decided
based on all the evidence available at trial, not simply the facts that
the DEP considered in issuing its penalties.5 8 If the EHB finds that
the DEP abused its discretion, it has the authority to issue a new
ruling. 59 If the EHB agrees with the DEP's action, however, the
appellant may bring the case before the Commonwealth Court and
may continue appealing up to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 60 When cases do proceed to these courts, the courts generally defer to the EHB ruling. 61
B.

Act Violations and Penalty Assessment

The Act states that the DEP should consider many factors in
assessing civil penalties. 62 These factors include: willfulness of the
violation, the actual damage, financial benefit of the penalties, deterrence for future violations, cost to the department, the size of
the facility, compliance history, severity and duration of the violation, amount of cooperation from the violator, speed with which
compliance occurs and whether the violation was voluntarily reported. 6 3 In American Auto Wash, Inc. v. Department of Environmental
Protection,64 the EHB considered several of these factors in determining whether the size and impact of the violation was accurately

56. See Upper Gwynedd Twp. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2005-358-MG, 2007
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 9, at **4-6 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Jan. 30, 2007) (explaining EHB
decides cases on presented evidence and issues adjudications).
57. No. 2001-253-MG, 2003 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 9, at *19 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd.
Jan. 31, 2003).
58. See id. (explaining DEP bears burden to prove by preponderance of evidence that there exists factual basis for assessed penalties).
59. For a discussion on the EHB's authority to alter DEP actions, see supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
60. See History of the EHB, supra note 8 (authorizing parties displeased with
EHB decision to appeal to Commonwealth Court). If still displeased, the litigants
may, if allowed, appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Id.
61. See Eureka Stone Quany, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 957 A.2d 337, 338-39 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2008) (affirming EHB's decision that placement on compliance
docket was appropriate and affirming EHB's decision to reduce but not eliminate
penalties); see also Am. Auto Wash, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 729 A.2d 175, 178 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1999) (highlighting appellants ability to appeal EHB decisions to
Commonwealth Court).
62. See 35 PA. CONN. STAT. § 4009.1 (2003) (applying series of factors after
assessing base penalty to increase or reduce penalty amount).
63. See id. (listing factors DEP considers in either lowering or increasing penalty amounts).
64. 729 A.2d 175 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
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reflected in the penalty assessment. 65 After considering these factors, the EHB upheld the penalty assessment, but reduced the pen66
alty amount.
While the EHB considers these factors listed in the Act, the
DEP created its own penalty matrix, which is designed to give specific weight to each factor. 6 7 This penalty matrix, however, is only
considered a guidance document. 68 As the EHB previously held, in
Upper Gwynedd Township v. Department of Environmental Protection69,
guidance documents do not have the force of law, and neither the

DEP nor the EHB are required to follow them in penalty
70
assessment.
Under this particular guidance document, the DEP may con71
sider the penalty's deterrent value when assessing the amount.
The Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld this idea in Westinghouse Electric v. Department of EnvironmentalProtection72 , when the
EHB issued a $3.2 million penalty to a company that allowed toxins
to seep into a nearby stream, violating the Clean Stream Law. 73 In

agreeing with the EHB decision, the court stated that the DEP is
authorized to implement a policy of deterrence without proof that
there will be an actual deterring effect on the company or the industrial community.7 4 The DEP may consider deterrence in con-

65. Id. at 181 (deciding that where base penalty for AAW's failure to install
new technology was calculated based on "throughput", subsequent ten percent increase in penalty, based on monthly "throughput", was unreasonable).
66. See id. (reducing penalty because AAW's non-compliance was partly
caused by factors beyond own control and because base penalty was incorrectly
augmented).
67. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2006-044-MG, 2007
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **41-44 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (describing
DEP's penalty matrix that takes into account factors set forth in Act and is used to
assess civil penalties).
68. See id. at *65 (explaining guidance document does not bear force of regulation and DEP is free to deviate from procedures in guidance document).
69. No. 2005-358-MG, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *7 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd.
Jan. 30, 2007).
70. See id. (explaining guidance documents do not have force of law and DEP
is not required to follow them).
71. See Eureka Stone Quary, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **41-43 (addressing
DEP's decision to apply highest base penalty in matrix range for Eureka's fugitive
dust violations to deter future violations).
72. 745 A.2d 1277 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000).
73. See id. at 1280 (concluding EHB can consider policy of deterrence factor
in calculating penalty assessment).
74. See id. at 1279 (holding large penalty will send message to potential polluters and will encourage company managers to pay more attention to environmental issues).
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junction with such factors as the number of violations, the duration
75
of the violations and the hazards the violations caused.
During the twenty-five years of the EHB's existence, Pennsylvania residents have filed almost ten thousand cases; the EHB,
however, had not encountered the appeal of a compliance docket
action until 2007.76 Eureka Stone Quarry is a landmark case because
the EHB had its first opportunity to decide whether the compliance
docket was used appropriately as a penalty. 77 This case is likely to
78
have an affect on how the DEP will use this tool in the future.

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

Eureka appealed to the EHB, objecting to a series of DEP-issued enforcement actions. 79 The EHB reviewed the DEP's assessed
penalties for fugitive emissions violations, in addition to inconsistent recordkeeping, broken equipment and installation of new systems without plan approval. 80 More importantly, for the first time,
the EHB examined the DEP's decision to use the compliance
docket as a penalty against a company. 81
A. Fugitive Emissions Violations
The EHB agreed with Eureka's argument that the fines for its
fugitive dust emissions violation were excessive. 8 2 Consequently,
the EHB lowered the fines, deciding that fines should not be
doubled and a company should not be punished more simply be83
cause two of the facilities had permits.
75. See id. (noting penalty was not solely based on deterrence, but number of
violations and duration of violations were primary factors).
76. See History of the EHB, supra note 8 (explaining most compliance docket
cases were withdrawn or settled).
77. For an explanation of Eureka's appeal against DEP's use of the compliance docket against Eureka, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
78. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (explaining finding in favor of Eureka may
have hampered DEP from using compliance docket tool in future).
79. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Dep't of Envil. Prot., No. 2006-044-MG, 2007
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **2-3 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Aug. 6, 2007) (providing background information and details of Eureka's appeal).
80. See id. at *3 (detailing Eureka's specific dissatisfaction with DEP's violations and penalties).
81. For a further discussion of the importance of the EHB's evaluation of
compliance docket use, see infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
82. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *41 (describing Eureka's argument that $6,500 for each fugitive dust violation at Rush Valley and
Chalfont facilities was unreasonably high).
83. For a further discussion of how the EHB decided that penalty doubling
was unreasonable, see infta notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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While the DEP properly followed the guidance document,
which suggests doubling the penalty for permitted facilities, the
EHB found no reasonable basis for this policy. 84 The EHB held
that the DEP's assertion, that the doubling was based on the facilities' sizes, was unfounded because no evidence was introduced regarding the sizes of the permitted facilities in comparison to that of
85
the un-permitted facility.

The EHB, however, disagreed with Eureka's argument that the
penalties should be lowered because the company's conduct was
only negligent, not willful. 86 The EHB held that the company was

reckless because Eureka chose not to develop an effective program
to control the problematic dust emissions. 87 According to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania, "[a] quarry operator has an affirmative duty to provide an adequate dust suppression system when
and where it is necessary. '88 Nonetheless, the EHB reduced the
penalties because the operator's level of knowledge was already accounted for in establishing a degree of willfulness; the doubling
based on the permit, therefore, was excessive.8 9
B.

Recordkeeping Violations

The EHB reduced the DEP penalty for rolling recordkeeping
violations absent evidence of prior recordkeeping issues. 90 Similarly, the EHB lowered the penalties because the lack of recordkeeping did not cause direct environmental damage. 91
The EHB agreed with the DEP, finding that the violations for
the lack of maintaining compliance history rolling records were appropriate; the EHB, however, agreed with Eureka, deciding that the
84. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *44 (explaining inspectors' arguments that guidance document suggests doubling penalty is necessary because itis based on size of facility).
85. See id. (finding DEP introduced no evidence regarding size of Eureka
quarries with permits compared to facility without permit).
86. See id. at **45-46 (relying on Act when determining DEP should consider
violator's culpability in assessing penalties).
87. See id. (holding Eureka responsible for failing to control dust emissions).
"Recklessness is demonstrated by a conscious disregard of the fact that one's conduct may result in a violation of the law." Id.
88. Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v.Commonwealth, 544 A.2d 1129 (Commw.
Ct. 1988). (stating quarry operator's duties regarding providing dust suppression
system).
89. For a further discussion of how the EHB decided that penalty doubling
was unreasonable, see infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
90. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **52-53 (finding
enhancements to base penalty for compliance history unreasonable).
91. See id. (finding no evidence that violation had potential to cause environmental damage).
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DEP should not have augmented the base penalty for such an offense. 9 2 The EHB found no evidence of prior failures to keep emissions records or that the violation could cause environmental
94
damage. 93 As a result, the EHB reduced the penalty amount.
Conversely, the EHB held that the penalties for Eureka's failure to complete daily site monitoring and maintenance logs were
reasonable. 95 If Eureka had complied, it would have noticed, and
possibly remedied, some of the fugitive dust emissions problems
96
without the DEP's interference.
C.

Equipment Violations

The EHB adjusted the broken manometer penalty, finding
that there was no proof that Eureka failed to properly maintain the
manometer in the past. 9 7 The EHB also found no evidence of emission violations from the broken equipment. 98
Despite Eureka's claim against any type of penalty for broken
equipment that was not in use, the EHB did not find any permit
provision that allowed Eureka to take the equipment out of commission until it was repaired. 99 While the EHB acknowledged that
perhaps such a provision should exist, the EHB held that the construction of permit provisions was for the DEP to decide. 0 0 Regardless, the EHB upheld some penalty because Eureka did not
report the broken equipment to the DEP and delayed repair for
three months. 10 '
92. See id. (explaining DEP assessed civil penalties against Eureka for failing to
maintain VOCs and NOx rolling records and for failing to maintain site monitoring and baghouse records).
93. See id. at *53 (determining VOCs and NOx annual emissions at both facilities were well below twenty-five tons per year approved in operating permits).
94. See id. (finding that total of $2,000 for recordkeeping violations was reasonable penalty).
95. See Eureka Stone Quary, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *54 (holding since
daily logs are fairly simple records to keep, it was unreasonable for Eureka not to
comply).
96. See id. (finding $700 penalty for not conducting daily site monitoring and
$1,400 for not maintaining maintenance logs reasonable).
97. See id. at *56 (considering circumstances surrounding violation and finding DEP's penalty unreasonable fit for gravity of violation).
98. See id. (explaining entire facility was closed in winter and no evidence existed that crusher and baghouse were in use when manometer was broken).
99. For a discussion of the application of the permit language in assessing the
violation, see infra notes 134-39 and accompanying text.
100. SeeEureka Stone Quariy, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **55-56 (suggesting
DEP should make provisions to allow permittee to take equipment out of commission for six months to allow for broken device replacement).
101. See id. at *56 (finding reasonable penalty for broken manometer was
$500).
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System Installation without Plan Approval

The EHB decided that the DEP's assessed penalties were too
high for Eureka's installation and operation of the NESCO systems
without plan approvals. 10 2 The EHB agreed with the DEP, holding
that Eureka was overzealous when it installed the system without the
DEP's plan approval. 10 3 Nevertheless, the EHB did not find that
the circumstances warranted such a high penalty. 10 4 The EHB
noted that upon notice of its improper NESCO systems operation,
Eureka immediately shut down and locked the systems until it received the plan approvals several months later.10 5 Based on Eureka's good faith effort to comply with the law, the EHB did not
find such a high penalty reasonable. 10 6 At the same time, the EHB
emphasized the importance of requiring DEP plan approval prior
to construction.1 0 7 As a result, the EHB issued a reduced
108
penalty.
E.

Placement on the Compliance Docket

Determining that the issue was not moot, the EHB decided to
review the DEP's placement of Eureka on the compliance docket
and found that placement was proper. 10 9 The EHB held that the
DEP's removal of Eureka from the docket did not render the issue
moot.1 10 As a question of first impression for the EHB, this decision is extremely important."1 '
102. See id. at *70 (assessing $6,500 civil penalties for each NESCO installation
at Chalfont and Warrington and additional $6,500 for NESCO use at Warrington
without approval).
103. See id. at *71 (explaining DEP properly places importance on requiring
plan approval).
104. See id. at *70 (detailing Eureka's attempts to address fugitive dust
problem).
105. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *38 (explaining
Eureka did not believe in need to wait for plan approval before installing wet suppression system).
106. See id. at **70-71 (finding punishing Eureka's one significant attempt to
comply with DEP regulations unreasonable).
107. See id. at *71 (weighing importance of issuing higher penalty). "Consistency in enforcement reasonably calls for some penalty." 1d.
108. See id. (reducing DEP penalty for system installation and use from
$19,500 to $7,500).
109. For a discussion of the EHB's reasoning for reviewing DEP's compliance
docket and concluding that DEP properly used the compliance docket, see infra
notes 147-156 and accompanying text.
110. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **58-59 (establishing exception to mootness doctrine when conduct is likely to be repeated yet continually evades review).
111. See id. at **59-60 (stating EHB reviews cases involving issues of public
importance or when one party will suffer detriment without court decision).
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The EHB explained that, by nature, placement on the docket
is limited in duration. 112 It can, therefore, always be argued that
there is no need for review because the company is usually removed
from the docket by the time the issue gets to the EHB.1 13 The EHB
acknowledged the importance of reviewing the issue, highlighting
its likely future impact on Eureka and other companies. 11 4
Upon review, the EHB held that the DEP's action was not an
abuse of discretion even though, at the time, two of Eureka's facilities were in compliance.1 15 Regardless, the EHB found that Eureka's operators should have been proactive in complying with the
permits, instead of merely reacting to a violation citation. 116 Upon
examining the company's compliance history, the EHB held that
Eureka lacked the intent to comply with the law; therefore, Eureka
117
was properly placed on the docket.
The EHB also did not find merit in Eureka's argument that its
placement on the docket was procedurally defective. 11 8 Eureka
claimed that prior to placement on the docket, it should have received a warning letter stating that it was in danger of being placed
on the docket. 119 The EHB disagreed, stating that the DEP is free
to deviate from sending this warning letter; the placement, there120
fore, was not procedurally defective.

112. See id. at **60-61 (explaining short duration could allow compliance
docket use to evade review).
113. See id. (agreeing while issue may be moot, it must be reviewed when permittee has continuing stake in controversy).
114. See id. at *61 (holding Eureka's placement on compliance docket may
have future impact on Eureka and that EHB must have jurisdiction to review).
115. See Eureka Stone Quarry, 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *62 (viewing entire
record and holding civil penalties from 2000 through 2004 did not effect Eureka's
operations).
116. See id. at **62-63 (explaining Eureka waited for DEP to catch violations
rather than correcting issues itself).
117. See Larson, supra note 1, at Bi (explaining serious enforcement action
was necessary after string of civil penalties failed to change Eureka's operations).
118. See Eureka Stone Quarry,2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *62 (claiming DEP
did not "informally" attempt to resolve violations by sending Eureka warning
letter).
119. See id. (noting warning letter is not requirement but suggestion through
guidance document).
120. See Upper Gwynedd Township v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS
40, at *7 (Pa.Envtl.Hr'g.Bd. Jan. 30, 2007) (explaining guidance and policy documents do not have force of law and DEP does not necessarily need to adhere to
them).
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CRITICAL ANALYSIS

As a matter of first impression for the EHB, this decision reinforces the DEP's significant authority in dealing with companies
that are lax on compliance efforts. 12 ' While the EHB correctly af-

firmed the DEP-issued violations and the DEP's use of the compliance docket against Eureka, the EHB undermined the DEP's
22
penalty matrix by reducing the penalty amounts.'
A. Fugitive Emissions Violations
In its fugitive emissions violations analysis, the EHB correctly
considered the violation's size, its environmental impact and the

company's culpability in assessing a base penalty. 12 3 A company
that is aware of its air pollution problem, but fails to adopt an effective control program is deemed reckless.124 This level of culpability
125
correctly affects the base penalty applied to the violator.
Applying the American Auto Wash analysis, however, the EHB
found no reasonable basis for doubling a penalty merely because a
facility holds a permit. 126 Because the operator's knowledge is already considered in the base penalty assessment, the EHB held that
127
Eureka should not be punished twice for advanced knowledge.
This result is counterintuitive because permitted facilities are by nature held to a higher standard. 128 Permitted facilities are required
to conduct their own inspections and to proactively assess possible
121. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (stressing EHB's ruling against Eureka
effectively upheld DEP's ability to use compliance docket threat against other
companies).
122. See Eureka Stone Quarry Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *41 (explaining EHB is not bound by DEP's penalty matrix and instead relies on Act for penalty assessment).
123. See id. at **44-45 (relying on American Auto Wash, Inc. to determine base
penalty assessments reflect size and impact of violations).
124. See id. at *45 (explaining Eureka's non-compliance cannot be defined as
willful because violation of DEP regulations was not deliberate).
125. See id. at *48 (assessing $3,250 penalty per fugitive dust violation based
on Eureka's recklessness).
126. See Am. Auto Wash Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 729 A.2d 175, 181 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1999) (deciding where base penalty for AAW's failure to install new
technology was calculated based on "throughput", subsequent ten percent increase in penalty, based on monthly "throughput", was unreasonable).
127. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **44-45
(equating American Auto Wash, Inc. analysis with EHB's reasoning to reduce Eureka's penalty).
128. For a discussion of standards applied to permitted facilities, see supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
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pollution problems. 129 Given this higher standard, the permitted
130
facilities should be punished more severely for their blunders.
Without this doubling, the penalty for Eureka's eighteen violations
is grossly understated and, above all, fails to deter.' 3 '
B.

Recordkeeping Violations

The EHB correctly implemented the DEP's deterrence policy
in reviewing and upholding a penalty issuance for record keeping
violations.1 32 Consistent with its previous decisions, the EHB held
that the deterrence factor has value, not only for the current violator, but also for other companies tempted to act similarly in the
future. 133

Conversely, the EHB erroneously lowered the penalties for the
rolling record violations.13 4 The EHB excused Eureka's failure to
maintain the rolling record by stating the requirement was new
and, furthermore, that the company was unfamiliar with implementing this different calculation system. 13 5 Because it took the
company time to acquire the appropriate methodology needed for
this type of recordkeeping, the EHB reduced the penalties.' 36 This
opinion well established, however, that the operator has an affirmative duty and responsibility to comply with DEP regulations. 137 By
reducing penalties because the operator was unaware of new requirements, the EHB effectively condones an operator turning a
blind eye to such advanced DEP requirements.138 Consequently,
129. See Eureka Stone Quary, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *46 (identifying Eureka's permit requirement to conduct self-inspections in ensuring against
fugitive dust emissions).
130. See id. (establishing Eureka could have achieved many simple abatement
measures by conducting required self-inspections).
131. See id. at *48 (calculating $58,500 penalty for eighteen violations).
132. See WestinghouseElectric. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 745 A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (Pa.

Commw. Ct. 2000) (holding penalty calculation using deterrence policy even without factual basis that deterrence will occur to be proper).
133. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *52 (noting
penalties should have specific and general deterrence goals).

134. See id. at *53 (dismissing DEP's argument for higher penalties based on
Eureka's poor compliance history and recalcitrance).

135. See id. (guessing rolling recordkeeping was not permit requirement prior
to 2003).

136. See id. at **52-53 (using specific circumstances to lower penalty from
$700 per violation to $500 per violation).
137. For a discussion of the establishing of quarry operators' duties, see supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
138. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *47 (citing
quarry operators should be committed to compliance and communicate commitment to facility employees).
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this decision frustrates the deterrent value that the EHB previously
39
applied.'
C.

Equipment Violations

The EHB's decision to lower the penalty for the broken manometer contradicts the explicit language of the permit issued to
Eureka.' 40 The EHB lowered the broken manometer penalty because there was no evidence that the crusher and baghouse were in
operation while broken. 1 4' The permit, however, requires Eureka
to "maintain pressure drop monitors in operable condition on all
fabric collectors which are associated with air contamination
sources for this source." (emphasis added). 14 2 The provision is silent on whether taking the machine out of commission would pre143
vent a penalty.
Furthermore, even after the DEP notified Eureka of the violation, it took three months for Eureka to repair the machine. 44
Based on the EHB's previous analysis regarding culpability, the
company acted willfully in its continued violation. 145 Yet, the EHB
reduced the penalty from $1,400 to $500, which practically condones this type of behavior and frustrates the penalty's deterrent
46
value.1
D.

System Installation without Plan Approval

The EHB reduced the penalty for installing the new equipment without approval because the EHB viewed this as Eureka's attempt to avoid further violations. 147 Decreasing this penalty
139. For an explanation of the deterrent value of penalty amounts, see supra
notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
140. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *55 (finding
no provision exists that would release Eureka from obligation simply because manometer was not in operation).
141. See id. at *56 (explaining DEP lacked evidence proving broken manometer caused air pollution emissions).
142. Id. (citing permit Condition 004).
143. See id. at **55-56 (admitting while taking equipment off line for replacement is reasonable permit provision, it is not Condition 004 language).
144. See id. at *56-57 (considering Eureka's inactive response to violation in
assessing penalty).
145. For a definition of culpability levels in assessing violation penalty
amounts, see supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
146. For an explanation of the deterrent value of penalty amounts, see supra
notes 129-130 and accompanying text.
147. See Eureka Stone Quary, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *70 (holding
DEP's penalty assessment unreasonable punishment for Eureka's effort to address
fugitive dust problem).
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encourages Eureka and other companies to blatantly ignore DEP
regulations and operate at will without oversight. 48 According to
DEP testimony, the DEP already informed Eureka that it would not
issue further violations while Eureka awaited the DEP's approval for
the installation of the new system. 1 49 Yet, the EHB erroneously re-

duced the penalty by focusing on Eureka's good faith effort to comply with the DEP's permit.1 50 Although Eureka knew plan approval
was required before installing and using the new system, it ignored
these requirements and began using the system anyway. 15 1 This ruling, reducing the penalties, is inconsistent with EHB's previous
152
analysis regarding culpability and deterrence.
E.

Placement on the Compliance Docket

The EHB's decision to review the DEP's use of the compliance
docket is significant primarily for two reasons.' 53 First, it is important because of its potential impact on future cases, and second because it places a check on the DEP's power.' 54 Because the EHB
found that the matter should be reviewed, it became an issue that
the EHB can review in future cases.' 55 If the EHB decided the issue
was moot, the DEP's use of the compliance docket would continuously evade review.' 56 In turn, this would give the DEP unbridled
authority to place any violator on the compliance docket as long as
it removed that violator prior to an EHB hearing. 57 Such discre148. For a discussion of culpability levels, see supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
149. See Eureka Stone Quany, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **37-38 (reiterating DEP's decision that if Eureka operated current system as best as possible
before receiving approval for new system installation, it should not be penalized
for dust violations).
150. See id. at *70 (stating DEP's violations against Eureka for addressing fugitive dust problem with recommended water suppression system were
unreasonable).
151. See id. (noting installation of new system without approval was intentional act and willful violation).
152. See id. at *71 (highlighting apparent inconsistency between lowering
penalties after recognizing importance of plan approval before construction begins and need for consistency in enforcement actions).
153. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (explaining this was first time DEP's
Southeast Regional Office used compliance docket tool).
154. See id. (noting significance of EHB's decision to review DEP's use of compliance docket).
155. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *60 (finding if
EHB does not review compliance docket tool then companies can only challenge
tool through complete litigation, likely causing unnecessary delay in business).
156. See id. (acknowledging problems of ruling issue moot).
157. See id. at **60-61 (holding placement on compliance docket is always
short in duration and could always evade review).
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tion could be potentially unfair to companies placed on the docket,
especially if it would result in the significant disruption of
business.1

58

This decision to uphold Eureka's placement on the compliance docket reinforces the DEP's authority.1 59 The EHB focused
on Eureka's lack of intent to develop a long-term solution to the
fugitive emission problems, as well as Eureka's compliance history
prior to its placement on the docket. 60 In deciding whether the
company was properly placed on the docket, the EHB correctly examined evidence of the company's effort to proactively prevent violations.' 6 ' This shows that both the DEP and the EHB seek a good
faith effort from a company regarding compliance. 62 The EHB
was consistent with its previous decisions holding that a company in

business for a long time should have the sophistication to know that
civil penalties are not simply a cost of doing business. 163 A company is expected to be proactive in addressing violations beyond
doing the bare minimum. 164 Given this decision, a company
should not wait for the DEP to issue violations before attempting to
16 5
correct problems.
VI.

IMPACT

The EHB's decision in Eureka Stone Quany, in conjunction with
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's affirmation, is certain to
have lasting effects on DEP operations.' 66 Namely this decision will
158. See id. at *61 (explaining EHB has jurisdiction over issue because of major impact it could have on Eureka and similar companies).
159. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (explaining if EHB did not uphold Eureka's placement on compliance docket, it could have prevented DEP from using
compliance docket tool in future).
160. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **62-63 (finding no evidence Eureka intended to comply with DEP regulations).
161. See id. at *63 (discussing lack of evidence in record regarding Eureka's
intention to develop long-term abatement plan for on-going fugitive emissions).
162. See id. at **62-63 (explaining companies should do more than bare minimum to avoid violations and should work with DEP in reporting problems
encountered).
163. See id. at *62 (holding that civil penalties should not be considered cost
of doing business).
164. See id. (expecting operators to do whatever is necessary to comply with
DEP regulations).
165. See generally Dep 't of Envtl. Res. v. PennsylvaniaPower Co., 337 A.2d 823 (Pa.
1975) (finding company's good faith effort to comply with law should be considered in assessing penalty amounts).
166. See Larson, supra note 1, at BI (explaining EHB's decision to uphold
compliance docket use allows DEP to use compliance docket as threat against
other companies).
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impact how the DEP assesses civil penalties and, further, how it will
decide to place a company on the compliance docket. Similarly,
the decision will influence how companies operate and attempt to
167
avoid these potentially harsh penalties.
Based on the Eureka decision, the DEP will no longer double
the penalty amount for facilities simply because they hold a permit.1 68 While the EHB reduced these penalties, finding no rational
basis for the doubling, the importance of these penalties should not
be overlooked.1 69 The Act states that:
[A] 11 fines, civil penalties and fees collected under this act
shall be paid into the Treasury of the Commonwealth in a
special fund known as the Clean Air Fund, hereby established, which, along with interest earned, shall be administered by the department for use in the elimination of air

pollution.

70

The legislature created these penalties not simply as a punishment or for a deterrent value. 1 7 ' The money collected from the
DEP-issued penalties is used for supplemental environmental
projects. 172 The DEP issues fines and penalties that are paid to the
state's Clean Air Fund. 1 73 In turn, this Fund finances air quality
improvements throughout the state. 174 As a result, the EHB's decision disallowing penalty doubling is likely to adversely affect the

167. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 31 PENNSYLVANIA LAW
WEEKLY (Philadelphia), Sept. 22, 2008, at 20 (listing reasons Commonwealth Court
upheld EHB's ruling). These reasons included Eureka's numerous past violations,
few proactive steps for remedy and failure to respond to DEP's attempts to resolve
problems informally. Id.
168. For an explanation regarding the unreasonableness of a penalty matrix
that doubles fines, see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
169. See generally Lead Envtl. Awareness Dev. v. Exide Corp., No. CIV. 96-3030,
1999 WL 124473 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 19, 1999) (explaining penalties directly remedy
violators' air pollution).
170. 35 PA. CONN. STAT. § 4009.2 (2003) (stating civil penalties are paid to
Clean Air Fund to protect air quality).
171. For a discussion of the deterrence value of civil penalties, see supra notes
67-70 and accompanying text.
172. See Sunoco to pay $123, 730 in Penalties, Emissions Fees for its Marcus Hook
Refinery, US STATE NEWS, Oct. 25, 2005 (stipulating penalties are used to offset
damage caused by negligent companies).
173. See Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection Orders Maid-Rite
Steak to Control Odors, Pay $25,425 Fine, US STATE NEWS, Sept. 25, 2006 (describing
fines finance air pollution control throughout Pennsylvania).
174. See id. (discussing role of Clean Air Fund).
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funds for air quality improvements, which can ultimately harm
175
Pennsylvania residents' health and welfare.
By reducing Eureka's penalty for installing the new wet-dust
suppression system, the EHB seemed to reward and even encourage
Eureka's non-approved construction project. 1 76 According to the
EHB, punishing Eureka for its first attempt to remedy air violations
would be too harsh.' 7v While it is important to encourage companies to remedy issues and comply with the law, it is inappropriate
for the EHB to encourage companies to begin construction without
78
the necessary permit approval.1
The DEP's purpose in granting construction approvals is to ensure that the company's "design, equipment, work practice or oper179
ational standards" reduce or control hazardous air pollutants.
The EHB's decision is likely to encourage other companies to begin
construction and new equipment installation without the DEP's approval. This could lead to a significant increase in improper construction, causing pollution and harm to Commonwealth residents.
Other companies that follow Eureka's lead may be subject to
similar DEP penalties.1 80 These companies, however, are also likely
to appeal successfully based on the Eureka decision.' 8 ' It will be
easy for these companies to claim that their violations were attempts to comply with the law; thus, they should not be severely
penalized for such behavior. 18 2 This decision could lead to major
construction and equipment installation problems, which will flood
the EHB with unnecessary appeals of valid penalties.

175. For a statement of the purpose of the Act, see supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
176. For a description of the imperfection in EHB's analysis dealing with the
penalty for non-approved installation, see supra notes 140-45 and accompanying
text.
177. For a further discussion of EHB's analysis in lowering penalties for installation of new NESCO system, see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
178. See Eureka Stone Quarry, Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., No. 2006-044-MG, 2007
Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at *71 (stating consistency in penalty enforcement is
essential).
179. 35 PA. CONN. STAT. § 4006.6 (2003) (establishing permit program to en-

sure emissions standards are met).
180. For a discussion of DEP's issuing of violations for non-approved equipment installation, see supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
181. For a discussion of the EHB's consideration of a company's good faith
effort to comply with DEP, see supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
182. For an explanation of the EHB's reasoning for lowering penalties for
system installation, see supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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The EHB decision will also help guide the DEP in determining
when to place a company on the compliance docket. 18 3 Because
the EHB deemed compliance history as a major factor in placing a
company on the compliance docket, the Eureka analysis may aid the
DEP in deciding which companies to place on the docket. 1 84 Further, this analysis may also help the EHB determine which companies were properly placed on the docket and what is needed to
uphold the DEP's decisions.18 5 The EHB stresses the importance of
companies being proactively compliant and willing to do whatever
necessary to achieve compliance. 18 6 As a result, the Eureka analysis
will guide companies in avoiding placement on the compliance
18 7
docket.
The Eureka decision has already proven influential, as Erie
Coke, Corporation is currently appealing air quality violations and
civil penalties equaling $6.1 million. 188 In July 2008, the DEP assessed penalties based on Erie Coke's failure to replace and repair
old equipment.' 89 On August 21, 2008, a mere fifteen days after
the Eureka decision, the DEP sent Erie Coke a notification letter,
placing the company on the compliance docket. 190 Based on the
Eureka decision, the DEP appears to have a newfound confidence in
utilizing the compliance docket tool. 19'
Typically, a hearing is scheduled six months after the appeal is
filed. 19 2 The question that remains is how the Eureka decision will
affect the EHB's analysis in Erie Coke. The EHB is likely to con183. For a discussion highlighting the EHB's analysis in deciding the compliance docket issue, see supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
184. See Eureka Stone Quany, Inc., 2007 Pa. Envirn. LEXIS 40, at **62-63 (holding lack of compliance history and lack of intent to comply with DEP regulations in
future as strong reasons to place companies on compliance docket).
185. See id. (stating EHB's reasoning for upholding DEP's compliance docket
use against Eureka).
186. For a discussion of the EHB's view of companies using good faith effort
to comply with regulations, see supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
187. For a discussion on the EHB's desire for companies to be proactive in
conforming to regulations, see supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.
188. See Robb Frederick, Erie Appeals $6.1 M Fine, EPE TIMES NEWS, July 24,
2008 (describing steel production company's violations).
189. See id. (explaining since 1942 company has used same 58 Coke ovens to
bake coal to remove impurities).
190. See id. (noting this is only second time DEP has placed company on compliance docket for air quality violations).
191. See Larson, supra note 1, at B1 (speculating if EHB did not uphold DEP's
decision to place Eureka on compliance docket it might have prevented DEP from
using tool again).
192. See Frederick, supra note 186 (explaining Erie Coke's adjudication is
pending).
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sider the Eureka analysis in determining whether the DEP used the

compliance docket tool correctly against Erie Coke.
As illustrated in Eureka Stone Quarry, the EHB is apt to review
Erie Coke's compliance history and previous activity in resolving air
quality violations. 19 3 Erie Coke's owner cites a number of improvements, including a newly implemented oven repair process, which
may help prove the company's proactivity in resolving air quality
issues. 194 If Erie Coke adequately proves a good faith effort to comply with the law and a proactive approach in dealing with the DEP,
the EHB is more likely to reduce the penalties and to remove the
195
company from the compliance docket.
Based on the EHB's opinion in Eureka, the DEP may argue the
validity of its compliance docket use by proving that Erie Coke has a
longstanding history of air violations. 196 If the DEP can prove that
Erie Coke lacked the ability and intent to comply with the law, the
EHB will most likely uphold the DEP penalties and the compliance
197
docket use.
No matter how the EHB decides Erie Coke's appeal, it is clear
that the Eureka decision has already affected how the DEP will continue to operate. 198 Furthermore, the Eureka decision will most
likely have a continued affect on how companies will operate in the
future and how they will appeal DEP-issued violations. 199 Lastly, the
Eureka decision is bound to affect how the DEP will decide when to
20 0
use the compliance docket, as to ensure its issuance is upheld.
Given these considerations, it is apparent that the Eureka decision
193. For a further discussion of the importance of compliance history and
proactive resolutions to air quality problems, see supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
194. See Frederick, supra note 186 (detailing patented repair process used to
reduce umber of joints on 58 coke ovens).
195. For a discussion on the EHB's desire for companies to put forth good
faith efforts to conform with regulation, see supranotes 152-56 and accompanying
text.
196. See Jim Martin, State Agency to again Monitor Erie, Pa. Foundry Coke Plant,
EIuE TIMES NEWS, July 7, 2008 (outlining Erie Coke's failure to respond to past
enforcement actions).
197. For a discussion on the EHB's reasoning for upholding DEP's compliance docket use against Eureka, see supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
198. For a discussion showing effect of Eureka on DEP's dealings with other
violating companies, see supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text.
199. For possible arguments companies will use to avoid harsh penalties and
compliance docket placement dervived from Eureka decision, see supra notes 165
and accompanying text.
200. For an explanation that the EHB's decision in Eureka suggests poor compliance history warrants use of the compliance docket, see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
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will continue to have a significant influence over the operations of
the DEP and various companies.
Erica Sharkey*
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Villanova University School of Law; B.A., 2003,
LaSalle University.
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